The aim of this paper is to study the interaction between Basel I, II and III regulations with monetary policy. In order to do that, we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a housing market, banks, borrowers, and savers. First, we …nd that higher capital requirement ratios (CRR), implied by the Basel regulations, increase the welfare of borrowers at the expense of savers and banks. Second, results show that monetary policy needs to be more aggressive when the CRR increases because the money multiplier decreases. However, this policy combination brings a more stable economic and …nancial system. Finally, we analyze the optimal way to implement the countercyclical capital bu¤er stated by Basel III. We propose that the CRR follows a rule that responds to deviations of credit from its steady state. We …nd that, for households, the optimal implementation of this rule together with monetary policy represents a welfare improvement with respect to Basel I and II and brings extra …nancial stability. 
Introduction
The recent crisis has taught us that a necessary condition for growth, technological advances, and innovation is to have a stable economic and …nancial environment. In order to promote economic recovery and stabilize the …nancial sector, some changes to …nancial regulation have been proposed. In this context, a very important package of regulations is the so-called Basel III. Basel III is a comprehensive set of reform measures in banking regulation, supervision and risk management. It was developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), to strengthen the banking sector and achieve …nancial stability. Furthermore, some of the new measures that Basel III introduces are aimed at preventing future crises, creating a sound …nancial system in which …nancial problems are not spread to the real economy. Preventive measures acting in this direction are known between researchers and policy-makers as macroprudential policies.
However, these changes to …nancial regulation have to coexist with monetary policy; therefore, the interaction of the policies conducted by central banks with the set of new regulations is a relevant topic of study. In particular, the transmission and the optimal monetary policy may change depending on the regulations that are in place.
The BCBS aims at providing some guidance for banking regulators on what the best practice for banks is. Its standards are accepted worldwide and are generally incorporated in national banking regulations.
The subsequent Basel regulations proposed by the BCBS 1 have introduced, among other elements, higher compulsory capital requirement ratios (CRR) for banks. Basel I and II required a minimum total CRR of 8%. 2 Afterwards, Basel III introduced a mandatory capital conservation bu¤er of 2.5% designed to 1 Basel I, signed in 1988; Basel II, published in 2004; and Basel III, agreed in 2010. 2 We are aware that Pilar I of Basel II signi…cantly increases the risk sensitivity of the capital rule, with respect to Basel I, and considers di¤erent approaches to compute the minimum CRR. However, for the goal of this paper, we only take into account the quantitative level of the CRR, not the qualitative implications.
enforce corrective action when a bank's capital ratio deteriorates. Then, although the minimum total capital requirement remains at the current 8% level, yet the required total capital increases up to 10.5% when combined with the conservation bu¤er. Furthermore, Basel III adds a dynamic macroprudential element in the form of a discretionary countercyclical seasonal bu¤er up to another 2.5% of capital, which requires banks to hold more capital in good times to prepare for downturns in the economy. In this way, Basel III tries to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excessive credit growth. 3 Therefore, the macroprudential approach of Basel III has two components: on the one hand, it increases the static CRR permanently and, on the other hand, it adds a dynamic macroprudential bu¤er which will depend on economic conditions. However, the way to implement this dynamic macroprudential component of Basel III has not been completely speci…ed by the Committee. 4 The BCBS states the objectives of this additional countercyclical bu¤er (CB): "The primary aim of the countercyclical capital bu¤er regime is to use a bu¤er of capital to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth that have often been associated with the build-up of system-wide risk" (BCBS, 2010). 5 Nevertheless, it leaves its implementation as an open question, encouraging authorities to apply judgment in the setting of the bu¤er using the best information available.
The BCBS also claims that the CB is not meant to be used as an instrument to manage economic cycles or asset prices; these are issues that should be addressed by other policies such as monetary policy.
Then, the interaction of the Basel regulation with monetary policy is of an extreme relevance. Therefore, it is very timely to do research on this topic to provide some general guidance to correctly implement this regulation, together with monetary policy. It is also crucial to consider both macroprudential aspects of Basel III, the increase in the static CRR and the countercyclical bu¤er since, depending on the country, the countercyclical bu¤er could be more di¢ cult to implement. For instance, in developing or low-income countries, the bu¤er could be problematic due to lack of data availability.
Capacity constraints and enforcement di¢ culties may make time-varying macroprudential rules more complicated to be implemented. In those countries, the most relevant aspect of the Basel regulation 3 The reform package is a major overhaul of Basel I and II. Basel III includes a comprehensive set of rules encompassing tighter de…nitions of capital, a framework for capital conservation and countercyclical bu¤ers, improved risk capture, a nonrisk-based leverage ratio, and a novel regime for liquidity risk. In this paper, we are interested in the capital requirement ratio and the countercyclical bu¤er as a macroprudential tool. 4 The bu¤er scheme is not fully discretionary. The BCBS proposes a 'common reference guide' that should form the starting point of the discussion. 5 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010). Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital bu¤er, BIS document.
would be the static CRR. In our paper, unlike the rest of the literature on macroprudential policies, we provide an extensive analysis not only to the time-varying CRR but also to the static ones, to see how they a¤ect welfare and the optimal conduct of monetary policy.
Thus, the aim of this paper is to study the welfare e¤ects of the Basel I, II and III regulations on CRR as well as its interactions with monetary policy. We would like to provide some general lines to correctly implement this regulation, together with monetary policy. We aim at explicitly quantifying the welfare e¤ects of increasing CRR as well as the e¤ects of introducing a dynamic macroprudential counter-cyclical bu¤er. Ultimately, our objective is to design an optimal policy mix that includes monetary parameters, the CRR, and the macroprudential CB to best achieve the goals of economic and …nancial stability.
In order to do that, we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model which features a housing market. The modelling framework consists of an economy composed by banks, borrowers and savers. Banks act as …nancial intermediaries between both types of consumers. This microfounded general equilibrium model allows us to explore all the interrelations that appear between the real economy and the credit market. Furthermore, such a model can deal with welfare-related questions.
In this setting, there are three types of distortions: price rigidities, credit frictions and loan frictions.
The …rst distortion appears because of the presence of sticky prices and monopolistic competition, typical in new Keynesian models in which monetary policy has real e¤ects on the economy. Savers, the owners of the …rms, may prefer policies that reduce this price stickiness distortion. Second, credit frictions are present because borrowers need collateral to take credit. Borrowers may prefer a scenario in which the pervasive e¤ect of the collateral constraint is softened. They operate in a second-best situation. They consume according to the borrowing constraint as opposed to savers that follow an Euler equation for consumption. Borrowers cannot smooth consumption by themselves, but a more stable …nancial system would provide them a setting in which their consumption pattern is smoother. 6 Third, loan frictions are found because banks, by Basel regulation, must have a CRR; they are constrained in the amount they can loan. Banks may prefer policies that ease their capital constraint, since capital requirement ratios distort their ability to generate pro…ts and thus to consume. 7 Furthermore, there are two policy authorities: the central bank and the macroprudential regulator.
The central bank aims at minimizing the variability of output and in ‡ation to reduce the distortion 6 In other words, if the …nancial system is very unstable and the asset prices (house prices in this framework) are very volatile, borrowers'consumption will be also very volatile since it depends on the value of the collateral. 7 In this model, an increase in the capital requirement ratio implies a lower leverage ratio, since higher CRR diminishes the percentage of deposits that banks can convert into loans and, therefore, reduces the capacity of banks of making pro…ts.
introduced by nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition, using the interest rate as an instrument.
The macroprudential authority can use the CB proposed by Basel III, with the CRR as an instrument, to achieve a more stable …nancial system. However, we will show that some welfare con ‡icts and trade-o¤s between agents may appear because of the di¤erent e¤ects of each policy on rigidities.
Using this framework, we address several key research questions. First, we analyze how the di¤erent values of the CRR, including those of Basel I, II and III, a¤ect welfare for di¤erent agents and for the whole society, for given monetary policy. We …nd that increasing the CRR is bene…cial for borrowers but welfare decreasing for savers and banks. Then, the Basel regulation seems to bring winners and losers to the economy.
Second, we examine the interaction between monetary policy and the Basel regulation. In this spirit, we consider how the optimal monetary policy changes with di¤erent values of the CRR. We observe that the higher the CRR, the more aggressive monetary policy needs to be in order to compensate for a lower money multiplier.
Third, we …nd an optimal implementation of the CB, the instrument that Basel III provides to the macroprudential authority, which delivers a more stable …nancial system, acting together with a monetary authority that cares about macroeconomic stability. We suggest that the CB follows a rule that increases capital requirements when credit deviates from its steady state and lowers it when the situation is the opposite. 8 Once we have established the rule, we look for its optimal reaction parameters, together with those of monetary policy. 9 Results show that the monetary and the macroprudential authorities acting together can deliver higher macroeconomic and …nancial stability. And, although there are winners and losers when applying the macroprudential policy, we …nd that there exists a system of transfers à la Kaldor-Hicks which can be implemented to obtain a Pareto-superior outcome to overcome this trade-o¤.
In terms of dynamics, our paper shows that Basel regulations also a¤ect the transmission of monetary policy. In particular, using the optimal parameters, we …nd that the higher capital requirements introduced by Basel III mitigate expansionary monetary policy shocks. And so does the optimal implementation of the CB, since the CRR goes up to avoid credit increases. 10 The rest of the paper continues as follows. Section 1.1 makes a review of the related literature.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes welfare implications of the new regulation, for given monetary policy. Section 4 explains the interaction between the CRR and monetary policy. Section 5 studies the optimal way to implement the CB, together with monetary policy. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
Our approach …ts into the ‡ourishing literature interested in analyzing macroprudential policies that deliver a more stable …nancial system, on the limelight after the crisis. The experience with this kind of policies is still scarce. However, although there is consensus about the need of these policies, the e¤ects of them are still not absolutely understood. Thus, given the novelty of this perspective and the uncertainty about its e¤ects, the studies on the topic are also quite recent.
Our analysis, though, focuses on quantifying the e¤ects of macroprudential policies in a very speci…c context: the Basel III regulation. We provide some guidance to optimally implement this new set of banking regulation for a wide range of countries. Therefore, unlike other papers in the macroprudential literature, we study both the macroprudential e¤ects of the permanent increase in the CRR of Basel III as well as the dynamic counter-cyclical bu¤er that it introduces. 11 Borio (2003) was one of the pioneers on the subject. He distinguishes between microprudential regulation, which seeks to enhance the safety and soundness of individual …nancial institutions, as opposed to the macroprudential view, which focuses on welfare of the …nancial system as a whole. Basel III regulation is based on limits on capital requirements. Borio (2011) states that several aspects of Basel III re ‡ect a macroprudential approach to …nancial regulation. However, there is some controversy around this regulation that has been pointed out by the literature. In particular, some concerns have been raised about the impact of Basel III reforms on the dynamism of …nancial markets and, in turn, on investment and economic growth. The reasoning is that Basel III regulation could produce a decline in the amount of credit and impact negatively in the whole economy. Critics of Basel III consider that there is a real danger that reform will limit the availability of credit and reduce economic activity. Repullo and Saurina (2012) shows that a mechanical application of Basel III regulation would tend to reduce capital requirements when GDP growth is high and increase them when GDP growth is low. In our paper, we explicitly introduce a countercyclical rule for the dynamic macroprudential component of Basel III, so that we avoid this e¤ect.
A number of studies have found that increasing capital requirements may reduce credit supply (Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004) . In this line, Drehmann and Gambacorta (2011) studies the CB and shows a simulation that indicates that the CB scheme might reduce credit growth during credit booms and decrease the credit contraction once the bu¤er is released. This would help to achieve a higher banking sector resilience to shocks. Nevertheless, their procedure is subject to the Lucas's critique: had the scheme been in place, banks' lending decisions would probably have been di¤erent. Our approach is robust to this critique because is based on a DSGE model, and, therefore, contributes signi…cantly to support the idea that if the regulator increases CRR, the credit supply would decrease.
We also contribute to this line of research analyzing welfare for several agents in the economy and stating for which groups Basel regulation could imply lower welfare. We …nd that capital requirements have a large welfare cost for banks. We also …nd that, even the regulation by itself is not welfare enhancing for savers, it can be when the macroprudential and monetary policies interact. In a similar way, Angeloni, I. and Faia, E. (2013) considers that the best combination of policy rules for welfare includes mildly anticyclical capital ratios (as in Basel III) and a response of monetary policy to asset prices or bank leverage. We explicitly calculate in a general equilibrium model the optimal parameters of both policies, acting together with a typical Taylor rule for monetary policy and the macroprudential CB based on credit deviation from its steady state, and the welfare e¤ects on the three types of agents (borrowers, savers and banks). in line with the current regulatory framework responding to credit), and monetary policy. They …nd that no regime, cooperative or non-cooperative between macroprudential and monetary authorities, makes all agents, borrowers or savers, better o¤. Our results show that this is the case for banks. However, we could …nd a system of transfers à la Kaldor-Hicks that generates a Pareto-superior outcome.
Model Setup
The modelling framework is a DSGE model with a housing market, following Iacoviello (2014) 
Savers
Savers maximize their utility function by choosing consumption, housing and labor hours:
where s 2 (0; 1) is the patient discount factor, E 0 is the expectation operator and C s;t , H s;t and N s;t represent consumption at time t, the housing stock and working hours, respectively. 1= ( 1) is the labor supply elasticity, > 0: j > 0 constitutes the relative weight of housing in the utility function.
Subject to the budget constraint:
where d t denotes bank deposits, R s;t is the gross return from deposits, q t is the price of housing in units of consumption, and w s;t is the real wage rate. The …rst order conditions for this optimization problem are as follows:
Equation (2) is the Euler equation, the intertemporal condition for consumption. Equation (3) represents the intertemporal condition for housing, in which, at the margin, bene…ts for consuming housing equate costs in terms of consumption. Equation (4) is the labor-supply condition.
Borrowers
Borrowers solve:
where b 2 (0; 1) is impatient discount factor, subject to the budget constraint and the collateral constraint:
where b t denotes bank loans and R b;t is the gross interest rate. k can be interpreted as a loan-tovalue ratio. The borrowing constraint limits borrowing to the present discounted value of their housing holdings. The …rst order conditions are as follows:
where b;t denotes the multiplier on the borrowing constraint. 12 These …rst order conditions can be interpreted analogously to the ones of savers.
Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries solve the following problem:
where f 2 (0; 1) is the …nancial intermediary discount factor, subject to the budget constraint and the collateral constraint and div f;t are dividends, which we assume are fully consumed by bankers every period, so that div f;t = C f;t :
where the right-hand side measures the sources of funds for the …nancial intermediary; household deposits and repayments from borrowers on previous loans. These funds can be used to pay back depositors and to extend new loans, or can be used for their own consumption. As in Iacoviello (2014), we assume that the bank, by regulation, is constrained by the amount of assets minus liabilities. That is, there is a capital requirement ratio. We de…ne capital as assets minus liabilities, so that, the fraction of capital with respect to assets has to be larger than a certain ratio:
Simple algebra shows that this relationship can be rewritten as:
If we de…ne = (1 CRR), we can reinterpret the capital requirement ratio condition as a standard collateral constraint, so that banks liabilities cannot exceed a fraction of its assets, which can be used as collateral: 13
where < 1. The …rst order conditions for deposits and loans are as follows:
where f;t denotes the multiplier on the …nancial intermediary's borrowing constraint. 14 
Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical …nal goods producers that operate under perfect competition and ‡exible prices. They aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function
1 3 Clerc et al. (2014) …nd, using a DSGE model, that the probability of default for banks is negligible for capital requirement ratios higher than 10%. Basel III imposes a capital requirement ratio of 10.5%, therefore, we assume that, taking into account the goal of the paper, in our model we do not have to include default risk for banks. 1 4 Financial intermediaries have a discount factor f < s: This condition ensures that the collateral constraint of the intermediary holds with equality in the steady state, since f = s f s
›0
where 
The price index is then given by:
Intermediate Goods Producers
The 
where 2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor. 15 This Cobb-Douglas production function implies that labor e¤orts of constrained and unconstrained consumers are not perfect substitutes. This speci…cation is analytically tractable and allows for closed form solutions for the steady state of the model. This assumption can be economically justi…ed by the fact that savers are the managers of the …rms and their wage is higher than the one of the borrowers. 16 A t represents technology and it follows the following autoregressive process:
where A is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and u At is a normally distributed shock to technology. We normalize the steady-state value of technology to 1.
Labor demand is determined by:
1 5 Notice that the absolute size of each group is one. 1 6 It could also be interpreted as the savers being older than the borrowers, therefore more experienced.
where X t is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost. 17 The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun setting. An intermediate good producer sells its good at price P t (z) ; and 1 ; 2 [0; 1] ; is the probability of being able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price P t (z) solves:
where "= (" 1) is the steady-state markup.
The aggregate price level is then given by:
Using (23) and (24) ; and log-linearizing, we can obtain a standard forward-looking New Keynesian
Phillips curve b t = E t b t+1 b x t +u t , that relates in ‡ation positively to future in ‡ation and negatively to the markup ( (1 ) (1 ) = ). u t is a normally distributed cost-push shock. 18 
Equilibrium
The total supply of housing is …xed and it is normalized to unity. The market clearing conditions are as follows:
Monetary Policy and the Countercyclical Bu¤er
In the standard new Keynesian model, the central bank aims at minimizing the variability of output and in ‡ation to reduce the distortion introduced by nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. 1 7 Symmetry across …rms allows us to write the demands without the index z: 1 8 Variables with a hat denote percent deviations from the steady state.
However, in models with collateral constraints, welfare analysis and the design of optimal policies involves a number of issues not considered in standard sticky-price models. In models with constrained individuals, there are three types of distortions: price rigidities, credit frictions and loan frictions. This creates con ‡icts and trade-o¤s between borrowers, savers, and banks. Savers may prefer policies that reduce the price stickiness distortion. However, borrowers may prefer a scenario in which the pervasive e¤ect of the collateral constraint is softened. Borrowers operate in a second-best situation. They consume according to the borrowing constraint as opposed to savers that follow an Euler equation for consumption. Borrowers cannot smooth consumption by themselves, but a more stable …nancial system would provide them a setting in which their consumption pattern is smoother. In turn, banks may prefer policies that ease their capital constraint, since capital requirement ratios distort their ability to leverage and increase their dividends.
In the standard sticky-price model, the Taylor 
Monetary Policy
For monetary policy, we consider a Taylor rule which responds to in ‡ation and output growth:
where 0 1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia, R 0 and R y 0 measure the response of interest rates to current in ‡ation and output growth, respectively. " Rt is a white noise shock with zero mean and variance 2 " .
A rule for the Countercyclical Capital Bu¤er
Here, following the Basel III guidelines, for the countercyclical bu¤er, we propose a Taylor-type rule that includes deviations of credit from its steady state, in order to explicitly promote stability and reduce systemic risk. This rule is analogous to the rule for monetary policy, but using the CRR as an instrument.
It implies that the capital requirement ratio ‡uctuates around a steady state value, corresponding to the Basel III requirement for capital (10.5%) and it increases when credit grows above its steady state. The implementation of this rule would include the capital bu¤er stated in Basel III CB . Then, the optimal implementation of Basel III CB would be the value of the reaction parameter that maximizes welfare:
This rule states that whenever regulators observe that credit deviates is above its steady-state value, they automatically increase the capital requirement ratio to avoid an excess in credit.
Welfare Measure
To assess the normative implications of the di¤erent policies, we numerically evaluate the welfare derived in each case. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2008), the two approaches that have recently been used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include either characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving the model using a second-order approximation to the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we take this latter approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the three types of agents separately. 20 The individual welfare for savers, borrowers, and the …nancial intermediary, respectively, as follows:
Parameter Values
The discount factor for savers, s , is set to 0.99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in steady state.
The discount factor for the borrowers is set to 0.98. 21 As in Iacoviello (2014), we set the discount factors for the bankers at 0.965 which, for a bank leverage parameter of 10% implies a spread of about 1 percent (on an annualized basis) between lending and deposit rates. The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0.1 in order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP to be approximately 1.40 in the steady state, consistent with the US data. We set = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1. 22 For the parameters controlling leverage, we set k, in line with the US data. 23 is the parameter governing the CRR, which will set according to the Basel regulation that we are considering (CRR of 8% for Basel I,II and 10.5% for Basel III). The labor income share for savers is set to 0.64, following the estimate in Iacoviello (2005) .
For impulse responses, we consider two types of shocks, a technology shock and a monetary policy shock. We assume that technology, A t , follows an autoregressive process with 0:9 persistence and a normally distributed shock. 24 Table 1 presents a summary of the parameter values used: 2 1 Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0.95 and 0.98 at quarterly frequency. We take the most conservative value. 2 2 Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimates could have a downward bias of 50%. 2 3 See Iacoviello (2011). 2 4 The persistence of the shocks is consistent with the estimates in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). In this section we analyze welfare for di¤erent capital requirement ratios, including the ones stated in Basel I, II, and III. Throughout the section, we keep monetary policy …xed. 25 Figure 1 presents welfare for di¤erent values of the CRR, given monetary policy. 26 This …gure displays how welfare is a¤ected by this parameter for each agent of the economy separately, and for the household aggregate. 27 The blue circle represents the values corresponding to the Basel I and II CRR, whereas the red triangle corresponds to the Basel III CRR. Notice that results are presented in welfare units, since the purpose of this …gure is to illustrate the issue from an ordinal point of view. 28 In this model, the welfare of the three agents is driven by di¤erent forces. This creates con ‡icts and trade-o¤s between them. Savers, who own the …rms, care about the sticky-price distortion, therefore in ‡ation a¤ects them negatively. Furthermore, in ‡ation makes their savings less valuable. Borrowers, are 2 5 This static study may be useful for countries with capacity constraints and enforcement di¢ culties, such some lowincome countries, which cannot easily adapt their economic policies. 2 6 We consider a benchmark case in which the coe¢ cient for interest-rate smoothing is 0.8, which represents an empirically plausible value, and the reaction parameters for in ‡ation and output are 0.5, as in the original paper by Taylor. collateral constrained in the amount they can borrow. Since their collateral constraint is binding, they always borrow the maximum amount they can, making it di¢ cult for them to smooth consumption.
Situations that reduce the collateral distortion and help them smooth consumption are bene…cial for them. More …nancially stable scenarios would do it. Moreover, in ‡ation is bene…cial for them, since their debt repayments are lower in real terms. In turn, banks are constrained in the amount they can lend since they are required to hold a certain amount of capital by regulation. This capital requirement distorts its intertemporal consumption decision (see equation 15) . Therefore, easing their constraint increases welfare for banks.
The top two panels of …gure 1 shows the trade-o¤ that appears between borrowers and savers welfare.
A higher CRR implies a more stable …nancial system, since banks are constrained in the amount they can lend. Borrowers do not follow an Euler equation for consumption, like savers do; they are not able to follow a smooth path of consumption. Their consumption is however determined by the amount they can borrow, which in turn depends on the amount banks can lend. Therefore, increasing the capital requirement ratio is welfare enhancing for borrowers. This happens however at the expense of savers, who are not …nancially constrained.
Furthermore, higher CRR makes monetary policy less e¤ective to stabilize in ‡ation, since the money multiplier (…nancial accelerator in this case) is weaker. This means that the higher the CRR the less stabilizing monetary policy and the higher in ‡ation volatility is. This is an extra reason why savers are worse o¤ and borrowers better o¤ when increasing the CRR. Savers su¤er from the sticky-price distortion and their savings are worth less. Borrowers see however their debt repayments decreasing in real terms.
If we look at the bottom right panel, we can see the evolution of the aggregate welfare. There we observe a bene…t from the increase in the CRR. Thus, the transition from Basel I, II to Basel III is bene…cial in aggregate terms.
However, in the model, we have a third agent, the …nancial intermediary. The left bottom panel shows how banks lose in terms of welfare with the increase in the CRR, because this tightens their constraint and a¤ects negatively their intertemporal consumption decisions.
This welfare analysis shows that the e¤ects of the Basel regulation are not evenly distributed. A stricter regulation makes borrowers be the winners, at the expense of bankers and savers, who are the losers. However, in the next sections we will show how monetary policy can help savers not to lose with the regulation.
Optimal Monetary Policy for di¤erent CRR
The above section was assuming that monetary policy was taken as given, that is, that a di¤erent CRR did not a¤ect the behavior of the central bank. However, this does not need to be the case. It seems plausible that the optimal conduct of monetary policy changes when the CRR increases. Then, in this subsection we analyze how the optimized parameters of the Taylor rule for monetary policy change for di¤erent values of the CRR. We de…ne the optimized reaction parameters as those that maximize household welfare. 29 The table shows the speci…c values corresponding to Basel I, II and Basel III, so that we can compare between these two regimes. Table 2 As we pointed out, when the CRR increases, the money multiplier (or in turn the …nancial accelerator) is smaller. Therefore, in order to obtain the same impact, monetary policy needs to be more aggressive. We …nd that especially for the in ‡ation reaction parameter, this is the case. If we look at the macroeconomic and …nancial volatilities (5th, 6th and 7th columns of the table), we observe that the macroeconomic volatility is very similar for the di¤erent values of the CRR but the …nancial volatility decreases, meaning that a higher CRR enhances …nancial stability and can thus be interpreted as a macroprudential policy. and we analyze the optimal implementation of both policies together. is, how much each agent would be willing to pay, in terms of consumption, in order to be in a more preferable situation.
Optimal Policy Parameters
We see that the transition from Basel I, II to Basel III, without its dynamic macroprudential component is Pareto improving for households. The appropriate re-optimization of monetary policy can make savers and borrowers better o¤. This is due to the fact that optimal policies aid to reach a more stable …nancial system, which helps borrowers to smooth consumption, and a lower in ‡ation, which bene…ts savers. However, banks are always worse o¤ because a higher CRR reduces their leverage and their capacity to make dividends.
In terms of volatilities, we observe that monetary policy increases its aggressiveness when moving to Basel III and Basel III CB . That makes that savers do not lose with the regulation because macroeconomic stability is not in danger. We also see that introducing the countercyclical capital bu¤er increases …nancial stability even more and it also helps to reduce in ‡ation volatility. In order to do that, we apply the concept of Kaldor-Hicks e¢ ciency, also known as Kaldor-Hicks criterion. 31 Under this criterion, an outcome is considered more e¢ cient if a Pareto-superior outcome can be reached by arranging su¢ cient compensation from those that are made better-o¤ to those that are made worse-o¤ so that all would end up no worse-o¤ than before. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not require the compensation actually being paid, merely that the possibility for compensation exists, and thus need not leave each at least as well o¤.
We see that in Table 3 , this is the case. Introducing the Basel III CB is not bene…cial for banks.
Albeit, we can …nd a system of transfers in which borrowers and savers would compensate the banks with at least the amount they are losing, so that they are at least indi¤erent between having the new regulation or not. Then, the new outcome would be desirable for the society and there would be no agent that would lose with the introduction of the new policy.
Impulse Responses
Impulse responses help illustrate the dynamic of the results. Figure 2 presents impulse responses for an expansionary monetary policy shock for the optimized values found in Table 3 . Impulses responses show the three cases analyzed: Basel I, II, Basel III and Basel III CB :
What we observe in the …gure is that, even if the shock is expansionary, the strong in ‡ation coe¢ cients in the Taylor rule, make the nominal policy rate actually increase so that in ‡ation is contained. However, 3 1 See Scitovsky (1941).
the real rate is still negative and output is increasing. As far as real interest rate is negative, the expansion makes borrowing increase. Nevertheless, it increases by more in the case of Basel I, II because the capital requirement ratio is not as high as under Basel III and Basel III CB . Then, increasing the capital requirement ratio reduces borrowing. When we allow for the countercyclical bu¤er to operate, borrowing increases only slightly. The regulator, that observes that borrowing is increasing with respect to its steady state uses its instrument to avoid this situation. Then, the capital requirement ratio increases above its steady state and helps containing credit.
Therefore, what we can conclude from the graph is that increasing the static capital requirement ratio, that is, going from an 8% in Basel I, II to a 10.5% in Basel III dampens the e¤ects of expansionary monetary policy shocks. And introducing the countercyclical capital bu¤er mitigates them even more. The channel comes mainly through borrowing; higher capital requirements reduce the capacity of consumers to borrow.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we use a DSGE model with housing to compute the welfare e¤ects of Basel I, II, and III regulations and its interactions with monetary policy. The model features three types of agents:
savers, borrowers and banks. The two latter are …nancially constrained. Banks are constrained by Basel minimum requirements ratios because they are required to hold a certain amount of capital in order to extend loans. Borrowers are constrained because they require collateral to obtain credit. In our model there are two policy authorities: the central bank, in charge of monetary policy, and the macroprudential authority, taking care of macroprudential policies. The objective of the …rst one is to achieve macroeconomic stability (in ‡ation an output), through the interest rate. The goal of the second one is to attain …nancial stability, using the capital requirement ratio of Basel regulations.
Within this framework, we explicitly calculate the e¤ects on welfare of increasing the capital requirement ratio in the spirit of the Basel regulations for a given monetary policy. This type of analysis could be very interesting for countries with capacity constraints and enforcement di¢ culties, such as some low-income countries, which cannot easily adapt their economic policies. This welfare analysis shows that the welfare e¤ects of Basel regulations are not evenly distributed. We …nd that while borrowers bene…t from this measure, because it increases …nancial stability, savers and banks are worse o¤.
Then, we analyze the interaction of the higher capital requirements in Basel I, II, and III regulations with monetary policy. We show that the optimal monetary policy becomes more aggressive the higher the capital requirement is, in order to compensate for a lower money multiplier. We …nd that a higher capital requirement increases …nancial stability and households'welfare.
Finally, we study the countercyclical capital bu¤er proposed by Basel III, interacting with monetary policy. We approximate this regulation by a rule in which the capital requirement responds to deviations of credit from its steady state. We show that the transition from Basel I, II to Basel III, without its dynamic macroprudential component is Pareto improving for households and it increases …nancial stability. Adding the capital bu¤er raises even more the welfare gains for savers and borrowers, improves the …nancial stability by more and it helps to reduce in ‡ation volatility. Furthermore, even though bankers are worse o¤, they can be compensated by households à la Kaldor-Hicks, so that it represents a Pareto-superior outcome.
When we analyze the dynamics of the model under the optimized values, we …nd that higher CRR and the CB dampen the e¤ects of expansionary shocks through a credit restraint.
